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Sepulveda: Computer Systems Fraud

COMPUTER SYSTEMS FRAUD - COMPUTER SYSTEMS
FRAUD IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA AND EHRS
John Sepulveda*

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
UNIVERSAL AMERICAN CORP. V. NATIONAL UNION FIRE
INS. CO. OF PITTSBURGH, P.A.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Universal American Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co.,2 the New York Court of Appeals found that a rider for
indemnification for losses due to computer systems fraud covers only
the unauthorized use of the computer system and not fraudulent use
by an authorized user.3 Universal American Corporation, a health
insurance company, sought to indemnify itself from losses due to
computer systems fraud by purchasing an insurance agreement from
National Union Fire Insurance Company.4 The contract provided for
coverage against losses incurred by an unauthorized user of the
insured’s computer system who commits fraudulent acts.5 Within
only a few months after purchasing this insurance agreement,
Universal suffered losses from authorized users inputting fraudulent
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data into Universal’s computer system.6 The Court of Appeals
considered whether the insurance agreement for computer systems
fraud applied to “a fraudulent entry . . . of Electronic Data or
Computer Program” caused by an authorized user’s fraudulent acts.7
It found that the contract precluded coverage for such losses, as the
contract covered only the unauthorized use of the computer system.8
The Court of Appeals’ holding in Universal alerts health insurance
companies seeking to indemnify themselves against these kinds of
losses that they should seek additional advice as to whether their
current computer systems fraud rider offers the coverage they seek.
The court’s holding in Universal also signals that health insurers
should also explore obtaining other insurance policies and additional
coverage.
This case note will primarily discuss the decision in
Universal, in which the Court of Appeals interpreted a rider for
indemnification losses due to computer systems fraud to cover only
unauthorized use of the system. Ultimately, this case note will
suggest that health insurance providers should purchase riders on
their insurance policies that cover these losses. This case note is
divided into five parts. Part II will outline the relevant facts,
procedural history, and the Court of Appeals’ holding in Universal.
Part III will analyze the various standards for fraudulent use and
unauthorized users when dealing with computer fraud. Part IV will
discuss Universal’s possible remedies, which include various
criminal and civil penalties against the providers that committed the
fraud. Part V will make recommendations regarding insurance
contract provisions for the health care insurance industry to help
mitigate the losses associated with computer-based insurance fraud.
II.

UNIVERSAL AMERICAN CORP. V. NATIONAL UNION FIRE
INSURANCE CO. OF PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

The Court of Appeals in Universal found that a rider
indemnifying the insured for losses from computer systems fraud
covered only unauthorized use of the computer system and precluded
coverage for losses incurred by an authorized user.9 The following
6
7
8
9

Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 79.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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section will discuss the factual background, the procedural history,
and the Court of Appeals’ discussion in Universal.
A.

Factual Background

Universal American Corp. (“Universal”) is a health insurance
company that provides “Private Fee-For-Service” plans under
Medicare Advantage or “Medicare Part C.”10 Medicare Advantage
plans, in general, are government-regulated programs of managed
health care that allow patients who are eligible for Medicare to
purchase health insurance from private companies like Universal.11
The most common types of Medicare Advantage Plans are HMOs
(Health Maintenance Organizations), PPOs (Preferred Provider
Organizations) and PFFS (Private-Fee-for-Service) plans.12 Patients
with an HMO Plan are required to use health care providers in their
network in order to have their care covered by the plan.13 On the
other hand, patients covered under a PPO Plan may use health care
providers outside of the network but may be required to pay more to
do so.14 Finally, patients covered under a “Private Fee-For-Service”
plan, like the one provided by Universal, can use their own health
care provider, who then submits claims to the insurance company for

10

Id.
Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, How Medicare
Advantage Plans Work, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicare-healthplans/medicare-advantage-plans/how-medicare-advantage-plans-work.html (last visited Feb.
10, 2017).
12
Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Different types of
Medicare Advantage Plans, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicarehealth-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/types-of-medicare-advantage-plans.html (last visited
Feb. 10, 2017).
13
Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Health
Maintenance Organization (HMO) Plan, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-changeplans/medicare-health-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/hmo-plans.html (last visited Feb. 10,
2017).
14
Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Preferred Provider
Organization (PPO) Plans, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicarehealth-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/preferred-provider-organization-plans.html
(last
visited Feb. 10, 2017).
11
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the health care services rendered.15 The Department of Health and
Human Services reimburses the insurer for those services.16
Universal utilizes a “computerized billing system that allows
health care providers to submit claims directly to the system.”17
Universal’s computer system automatically processes, approves, and
pays the claims without first checking the authenticity of these
claims.18 Universal purchased insurance coverage for a variety of
losses from National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania (“National Union”), which is a provider of commercial
and personal insurance coverage.19 Within only a few short months
of obtaining coverage, Universal suffered more than $18 million in
losses for fraudulent claims for health care services entered into
Universal’s computer system that were never actually performed.20
These fraudulent claims proliferated due to Universal’s automated
computer system, which allowed health care providers to
automatically receive their fee after entering their claims without any
check to determine whether their services were actually performed.21
Universal sought payment from National Union for these losses.22
National Union denied coverage to Universal and claimed that the
contract rider did not cover these losses.23 Specifically, National
Union argued that these losses were standard insurance fraud and not
the kind of “computer fraud” covered by the contract rider, which
only covered losses resulting directly from “fraudulent . . . entry of
Electronic Data” by unauthorized users.24 The contract rider reads as
follows:
Computer Systems Fraud
Loss resulting directly from a fraudulent

15
Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Private Fee-forService (PFFS) Plans, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicare-healthplans/medicare-advantage-plans/private-fee-for-service-plans.html (last visited Feb. 10,
2017).
16
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 79.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 80.
21
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 79.
22
Id. at 80.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 79-80.
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(1) entry of Electronic Data or Computer Program
into, or
(2) change of Electronic Data or Computer Program
within
the Insured’s proprietary Computer System or a
Computer System listed in the Schedule below; . . .
provided that the entry or change causes
(a) Property to be transferred, paid or delivered,
(b) An account of the Insured, or of its customer, to be
added deleted, debited or credited or
(c) An unauthorized account or a fictitious account to
be debited or credited.25
The Computer Systems Fraud Rider contained several exclusions:
(B) loss resulting directly or indirectly from
negotiable instruments, securities, documents or other
written instruments which bear a forged signature, or
are counterfeit, altered or otherwise fraudulent and
which are used as source documentation in the
preparation of Electronic Data or manually keyed into
a data terminal.26
(D) loss resulting directly or indirectly from the input
of Electronic Data into a Computer System terminal
device either on the premises of a customer of the
Insured or under the control of such a customer by a
person who had authorized access to the customer’s
authentication mechanism.27
(E) loss resulting directly or indirectly from the theft
of confidential information.28
In other words, the subtitle, “Computer Systems,” covers the insured
for losses resulting directly from entry of electronic data into
Universal’s computer system, provided that the entry or changed data
25

Id. at 79.
Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 46-47, Universal American Corp. v. National Union
Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, P.A., 2014 WL 10049066 (2014) (No. 2014-00133).
27
Id. at *17-18.
28
Id. at *51.
26
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causes Universal to pay for a service.29 Next, under “Exclusions,”
the rider expressly does not cover losses resulting directly or
indirectly from fraudulent negotiable instruments bearing a false
signature used as source documentation or from the input of
electronic data on the premises of a customer of the insured by an
authorized person or “from the theft of confidential information.”30
Universal sued National Union for damages and declaratory relief
because National Union refused to cover Universal’s losses.31
B.

Procedural History

Universal brought an action against National Union for breach
of the contractual provision insuring against losses caused by
computer systems fraud.32 Universal moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the policy covered losses caused by fraudulent entry of
claims which were never provided.33 National Union then crossmoved for summary judgment34 on the grounds that the insurance
policy was intended to insure only against losses due to computer
hackers or unauthorized users.35
The Supreme Court of New York County held that the
language of the rider did not support Universal’s interpretation of the
contract, denying Universal’s motion and granting National Union’s
cross-motion.36 Universal appealed the trial court’s dismissal.37 The
First Department affirmed as modified, and Universal appealed
further to the New York Court of Appeals.38
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed as well because it
rejected Universal’s argument that an insurance agreement for
computer systems fraud that applied to “a fraudulent entry of
Electronic Data or Computer Program” encompasses the losses
caused by an authorized user’s submission of fraudulent data into
29

Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *5.
31
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 80.
32
Universal American Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh,
P.A., 38 Misc. 3d 859, 860 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2013).
33
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 80.
34
Id.
35
Universal, 38 Misc. 3d at 862.
36
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 80.
37
Id. at 79.
38
Id. at 80.
30
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Universal’s system.39 The court held that the agreement was
“unambiguous and ‘fraudulent entry’ refers to unauthorized access
into [Universal’s] computer system and not to content submitted by
authorized users.”40
C.

The Court of Appeals’ Reasoning

In Universal, the New York Court of Appeals noted that “an
insurance agreement is subject to principles of contract
interpretation”41 as a matter of law.42 The court also acknowledged
that the various provisions in “an insurance contract must be given
their plain and ordinary meaning . . .”43 Relying on its previous
decision in Mostow v. State Farm Insurance Cos.,44 the court held
that the test for insurance contract ambiguity is “the reasonable
expectations of the average insured . . . employing common
speech.”45 In other words, a contract is ambiguous if the ordinary
policyholder’s reasonable expectations could come to a different
understanding of the terms than the insurance company.46 The court
in Universal concluded that the rider’s language “unambiguously”
applied to losses caused by unauthorized users of Universal’s
computer system and not to losses resulting from fraudulent entry by
an authorized user.47
The court examined two features of the rider’s language in
Universal. First, the court found that the subtitle, “Computer
Systems,” demonstrated that the focus of the rider was on the
computer system as opposed to fraudulent content.48 Second, under
“Exclusions,” the rider expressly did not cover losses resulting from
fraudulent instruments “which are used as source documentation in
the preparation of Electronic Data or manually keyed into a data

39

Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 79.
41
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 80.
42
Id.
43
Id. (citing Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bear Stearns, 10 N.Y.3d 170, 177 (2008), quoting
Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bear Stearns Cos., Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 264, 267 (2007)).
44
Mostow v. State Farm Ins. Companies, 88 N.Y.2d 321 (1996).
45
Universal, 37 N.E.3d 81 (citing Mostow, 88 N.Y.2d at 327).
46
Mostow, 88 N.Y.2d at 326-27.
47
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81.
48
Id.
40

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 [2017], Art. 11

548

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

terminal.”49
The court held that losses described under the
“Exclusions” subtitle were considered billing fraud, as opposed to the
computer fraud, which was covered by the contract rider.50 Judge
Rivera, writing for the majority, emphasized that if Universal and
National Union intended to cover billing fraud, there would have
been no reason to exclude content from fraudulent instruments.51
To assist in determining the intent of the coverage of the
contract rider, the Court of Appeals in Universal also examined the
ordinary definitions of “fraudulent,” “entry,” and “change,”52 which
the contract rider did not define.53 The court looked to MerriamWebster, which defines (1) “fraudulent” as “deceit,”54 (2) “entry” as
“the act of entering” or “the right or privilege of entering,”55 and (3)
“change” as “to make different” or “alter.”56 Based on these
definitions, the court concluded that “fraudulent” “qualifies the act of
entering or changing data or a computer program.”57 The court
determined that in order to rise to the level of fraudulence, the actor
must have actively changed data or computer code, as opposed to
merely using a computer to fraudulently submit claims for services
never rendered.
The New York Court of Appeals next examined Universal’s
two principal arguments. First, Universal argued that, for the
purposes of the rider, “fraudulent entry” and “fraudulent input” had
the same meaning, in contrast with National Union’s argument that
the two terms did not have the same meaning.58 Specifically, since
the health care providers that submitted fraudulent claims had
inputted fraudulent data, Universal argued that fraudulent entry could
only result from the inputting of fraudulent data.59 The court
disagreed with Universal and held that these terms did not have the
same meaning due to the rider’s language, which stated that coverage
was limited to “[l]oss resulting directly from a fraudulent (1) entry of
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id.
Id.
Id.
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81.
Id.
Id.
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Electronic Data or Computer Program . . . .”60 As such, treating the
terms “fraudulent entry” and “fraudulent input” as synonyms would
ignore the application of the remaining language contained in the
rider to “Computer Systems Fraud.”61 This intentional placement of
the word “fraudulent” before the word “entry” demonstrated the
parties’ intent to have the rider cover use of the computer system
through “deceitful and dishonest access.”62
Second, Universal argued that the court should base its
decision on the Superior Court of Connecticut’s decision in Owens,
Schine & Nicola, P.C. v. Travelers Casualty and Surety of America.63
In Owens, the court held that the term “computer systems fraud” in a
contract “can reasonably be interpreted to encompass fraud
committed through a computer.”64 There, the plaintiff, Owens,
Schine & Nicola, P.C. (“Owens”), purchased an insurance contract
from Travelers Casualty and Surety Company (“Travelers”).65 The
insurance contract in this case included a “Computer Fraud”
provision66 and also defined computer fraud in its rider as “[t]he use
of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of Money, Securities
or Other Property from inside the Premises or Banking Premises
. . . .”67 In Owens, the computer did not cause the actual transfer of
funds but instead the fraudster used the computer to send several emails, which then tricked Owens into transferring the funds.68
Specifically, after the parties exchanged a series of e-mails, the
fraudster executed a retainer agreement with Owens.69 Owens was
then sent a check for $198,610.00 and was directed by e-mail to
deposit the check and wire $197,110.00 to the fraudster’s South
Korean account.70 The check was later determined to be fraudulent
by Wachovia Bank and was not honored.71 Owens’ IOLTA account
60

Id. at 79-81.
Id. at 81 (stating “Universal’s proposed interpretation is easily achieved by providing
coverage for a ‘loss resulting directly from fraudulent data’ ”).
62
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81.
63
Owens, Schine & Nicola, P.C. v. Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. of Am., 2010 WL
4226958 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010).
64
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81-82 (discussing Owens, 2010 WL 4226958 at *1).
65
Owens, 2010 WL 4226958 at *1.
66
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 82.
67
Id.
68
Owens, 2010 WL 4226958 at *1-2.
69
Id.
70
Id. at *1.
71
Id. at *2.
61
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was debited the $197,110.00, at which point Owens submitted a
claim to Travelers under the Computer Fraud provisions of their
insurance policy.72 The question became whether, in light of the
parties’ reasonable interpretation of the terms, the computer, which
was not used to input fraudulent data but to send emails that would
later induce fraud, was one of the primary factors in causing this
computer fraud.73 The court in Universal was unpersuaded by
Universal’s reliance on Owens, as Owens focused more on whether a
computer had been used in such a way to constitute computer fraud.74
In Universal, the computer was clearly used in a manner that resulted
in payment for claims for services that were never provided because
all of the fraudulent entries were directly entered by computer into
Universal’s Computer System.75
The Supreme Court of New York County in Universal relied
primarily on Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. v. Chubb Group of
Insurance Cos.,76 a New Jersey state appellate case regarding the
interpretation of a “Computer Systems” insuring agreement.77 In
Morgan Stanley, the insurance company denied coverage, stating that
there was no “fraudulent input” because the customer who entered
the fraudulent instructions was an authorized user of Morgan
Stanley’s computer system.78 The contract contained a provision that
indemnified the insured for losses arising out of the fraudulent input
of electronic data.79 This provision was subject to an exclusion that
explicitly barred loss from an authorized user.80 The court held that,

72

Id.
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 82.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 79. “The matter before us involves Universal’s demand for indemnification to
cover losses resulting from health care claims for unprovided services, paid through
Universal’s computer system.” Id.
76
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. v. Chubb Group of Ins. Companies, 2004 WL
5352285 (N.J. Super. L. 2004).
77
Id. at *5-6.
78
Id.
79
Id. at *2.
80
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. v. Chubb Group of Ins. Companies, 2005 WL
3242234, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 2, 2005):
The computer systems insuring agreement was subject to Exclusion (q),
which provides that the agreement does not cover ‘loss by reason of the
input of Electronic Data at an authorized electronic terminal . . . or a
Customer Communication System by a customer or other person who
had authorized access . . . .’ Thus, the exclusion, which seems clear and
73
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pursuant to this exclusion, there was no fraudulent input because the
customer was an authorized user at an authorized terminal.81 The
court in Universal found Morgan Stanley instructive because, as in
Universal, the contract specified that it did not provide coverage for
authorized users who entered fraudulent data.82
Ultimately, in Universal, the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that the contract rider that insured against “Computer
Fraud” did not apply to losses from the data submitted by authorized
users, even though computers were used to commit fraud; instead, the
contract rider only applies to “hacking.”83
III.

FRAUDULENT ACTS VERSUS UNAUTHORIZED USERS

An issue that arises from the inclusion of computer systems
fraud riders in insurance contracts is whether the party that
committed fraud was an otherwise authorized user of the covered
computer system at the time he committed the fraudulent act. The
New York Court of Appeals in Universal might have reached a
different conclusion had it considered the following facts with respect
to whether the contract rider covered fraud committed by authorized
users: (1) the insurance industry defines computer fraud in a manner
contrary to the hacker-centric definition provided by the court in
Universal, (2) authorized users can commit fraudulent acts, (3) the
terms “fraudulent” and “unauthorized” are not synonymous, and (4)
computer fraud does not require high tech “hacking.”
The hacker-centric definition provided by the court in
Universal is contrary to the definition used in the insurance industry
for computer fraud. The International Risk Management Institute, a
major insurance educational organization, defines “Computer
Systems Fraud” insurance as covering “loss resulting from fraudulent
input or alteration of electronic data or computer programs within the
insured’s computer system by a nonemployee.”84 This definition is in
unambiguous, excludes coverage for fraud committed by customers or
other authorized persons.
Id.
81

Id. at *5.
Universal, 38 Misc. 3d at 863-64.
83
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81.
84
Brief for United Policyholders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 8-9,
Universal Am. Corp. v. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA., 37 N.E.3d 73 (2015)
(No. 2014-00133).
82
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line with the definition proposed by Universal, yet is contrary to the
Court of Appeals’ interpretation.85 The Court of Appeals defines
computer fraud as “wrongful acts in manipulation of the computer
system, i.e. by hackers.”86 There were no hackers in Universal.87
The facts instead comport with the International Risk Management
Institute’s definition because Universal suffered losses resulting from
fraudulent input within Universal’s computer system by health care
providers who were non-employees.88 In other words, if the court in
Universal had used the industry definition, the court would have held
that there was computer systems fraud due to the input of fraudulent
data by service providers or vendors who were not employees of the
insured.89
An additional point that the court in Universal failed to
consider is that an authorized user can commit fraudulent acts. In
Universal, the Court of Appeals insisted that the two terms were
mutually exclusive, which resulted in its characterization of the
health care providers as authorized users.90 In contrast, the United
States District Court, Eastern District Michigan, Southern Division in
United States v. Khan, 91 held that a user may be authorized and still
commit fraudulent acts.92 In Khan, the health care provider, Amjad
Khan, and his associates submitted false claims for health care
benefits and services.93 The health care provider in Khan was an
authorized user but the court nonetheless held that these false claims
rose to the level of fraud because Khan, as a health care provider, was
authorized to seek reimbursement from Medicare but fraudulently
sought this reimbursement by presenting false statements.94
Specifically, the health care provider’s fraudulent acts included
submitting “[f]raudulent entries in cost reports and supporting
documentation submitted to Medicare by AHHC.”95 In Universal,
the health care insurer similarly received false claims by authorized
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81.
Id. at 80.
Universal, 38 Misc. 3d at 861.
Id.
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 79.
Id.
United States v. Khan, 2008 WL 2782669 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
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users for services not provided.96 The court should have compared
the facts in Universal to the facts in Khan and then based its decision,
at least in part, on the reasoning of Khan. Similarly, in People v.
Severino,97 the defendant, a nursing home business manager, made
fraudulent entries in applying for Medicaid reimbursement.98 There,
the defendant fraudulently listed over $63,000.00 in expenditures as
incurred during patient care.99 The defendant’s wife and son owned
the nursing home and employed the defendant there.100 The New
York Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the trial
court’s judgment convicting the defendant of offering a false
instrument and grand larceny.101 As in Universal, the fraudsters in
Severino were authorized users of the system.102 The court in
Universal should have ruled in Universal’s favor because the
authorized users in Universal, like the authorized users in Severino
and Khan, used the computer system in a fraudulent manner by
submitting false claims.
The outcome in Universal would have been different had the
court not interpreted the words “fraudulent” and “unauthorized” as
synonymous. The First Department in Waters v. Horace Waters &
Co.103 held that the terms “fraudulent” and “unauthorized” are not
synonymous because an individual can be authorized to do a
fraudulent action.104 In Waters, a stockholder brought an action to
cancel some shares of treasury stock.105 The corporation issued the
stocks at par value to an older employee and officer of the
corporation to ensure his retention.106 Although stocks were given to
the employee-stockholder, she was not offered the opportunity to
subscribe to a proportionate part of the three shares.107 The court

96

Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 79.
People v. Severino, 63 A.D.2d 1010 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1978).
98
Id. at 1010.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Severino, 63 A.D.2d at 1010.
103
Waters v. Horace Waters & Co., 130 A.D. 678 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1909) aff’d, 201
N.Y. 184 (1911).
104
Id. at 685 (stating “[u]nauthorized acts are not necessarily fraudulent”).
105
Id. at 683.
106
Id. at 684.
107
Id. at 684-85.
97
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held that the issuance of the three shares constituted fraud,108 even
though the corporation was authorized to issue them.109 On the other
hand, the court in Universal held that the coverage extended only to
“wrongful acts in manipulation of the computer system, i.e. by
hackers,” not by authorized users.110 Though the health care
providers were authorized users of the system, it is arguable that they
committed fraudulent acts by making claims for services never
rendered. If the court had not interpreted the terms “fraudulent” and
“unauthorized” as synonyms, the court may have held similarly to
Waters on the issue of computer fraud. Such an interpretation is
consistent with the plain text of the rider, which covered “[l]loss
resulting directly from a fraudulent (1) entry of Electronic Data or
Computer Program,” as opposed to the current interpretation as
unauthorized entry.111
Had the Court of Appeals interpreted the contract provisions
not to require a “computer hacking incident” for indemnification
against losses, the policy would have covered Universal for losses
incurred due to fraudulent claim submissions in its computer system.
In Owens, the court held “that a computer hacking incident” was not
a requirement for coverage in a policy indemnifying losses caused by
computer fraud.112 No “computer hacking incident” had taken place;
instead, the fraudulent act was the direct result of the third party who
had communicated with Owens electronically.113 The insured sought
coverage under a provision that allowed indemnification for losses
due to computer fraud and that required only “the use of any
computer” in committing such fraud.114 Similar to the policy in
Universal, the contract in Owens did not use the words “hacking” or
“unauthorized user.”115 In Universal, the traditional computer hacker
did not commit the hacking, and the contract did not use the term
hacking; instead, an authorized user caused the fraud by submitting

108

Waters, 103 A.D. at 686. “[T]he issue of the three shares was fraudulent. It was a
fraud on the corporation.” Id.
109
Id. “The corporation has the right to bring an action to cancel said shares as
fraudulently issued . . . [and] is in the control of the trustees who issued the shares.” Id.
110
Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 80.
111
Id. at 79.
112
Owens, 2010 WL 4226958 at *7.
113
Id. at *8.
114
Id. at *7-8.
115
Id. at *8.
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fraudulent claims within the computer system.116 If the court in
Universal had interpreted the contract using the same criteria as the
court in Owens, the contract would have covered Universal for the
fraudulent acts, which were the result of providers committing fraud
using Universal’s computer system.
Ultimately, in light of these cases, the court in Universal
might have come to a different conclusion had it taken into account
that: (1) fraudulent acts can be committed by authorized users; (2) the
terms “fraudulent” and “unauthorized” are not synonymous; and (3)
computer fraud does not necessarily require hacking—the mere use
of a computer in an authorized manner to assist in committing fraud
is sufficient. First, the insurance industry defines “Computer
Systems Fraud” as covering losses “resulting from fraudulent input
. . . within the insured’s computer system by a nonemployee.”117 In
Universal, the perpetrators of the fraud were neither employees nor
customers; they were service providers or vendors that contracted
with Universal.118 Second, authorized users, such as doctors and
other health care providers like the ones in Universal, can commit
fraudulent acts in an insured’s system by submitting fraudulent
expenditures. An act can be fraudulent and authorized at the same
time—merely because users are authorized to use a system does not
mean that they are authorized to utilize the system to commit fraud.
Although Universal authorized its health care providers to enter
claims into its system, Universal did not authorize the submission of
fraudulent data in its system.119 Third, the commission of computer
fraud does not require traditional hacking of a computer system to
commit fraud. In Universal, fraudulent acts were the result of
providers committing fraud using Universal’s computer system.120
The fraudulent acts were not the result of traditional “hacking,” but
by the service providers simply entering fraudulent claims for
services that they never provided.121

116

Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 78-80.
Brief for United Policyholders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 8-9,
Universal Am. Corp. v. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA., 37 N.E.3d 73 (2015)
(No. 2014-00133).
118
Universal, 37, N.E.3d at 78-79.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 78.
121
Id. at 80.
117
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HEALTH CARE FRAUD PENALTIES

The Court of Appeals’ decision in Universal, which confirms
that insurance will not cover Universal’s losses, leaves Universal
with few remaining remedies, all of which require pursuit of the
various health care providers that committed the fraud. In Universal,
the health care providers were authorized users of the insured’s
system for submitting claims.122 Health care insurers such as
Universal have the following remedies available against those
committing health care fraud: 1) criminal penalties for fraud under
Title 18 of the United States Code section 1347;123 2) both civil and
criminal penalties under the Federal False Claims Act, 31 United
States Code section 3729, for defrauding the government;124 3) civil
and criminal penalties under the New York False Claims Act,125 for
filing fraudulent claims; 4) civil and criminal penalties under New
York Consolidated Laws Social Services Law section 145,126 for
filing fraudulent claims; and finally 5) a lawsuit in state court
alleging fraud.127 However, due to the relatively small damages
caused by each individual perpetrating fraud, and the high cost of
prosecuting those committing the fraud, Universal will have
difficulty persuading the government to prosecute these
individuals.128
A.

Criminal Penalties

The criminal penalties against health care providers
committing health care fraud allow for prison, fines, and
restitution.129 Criminal penalties as a remedy are difficult for victims
of health care fraud to obtain because criminal prosecution is at the

122

Id. at 78.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2010).
124
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2011).
125
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 187-194 (McKinney 2013).
126
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 145(b) (McKinney 2007).
127
See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2010); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2011); N.Y. SOC. SERV. Law
§ 145-b (McKinney 2007); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 187-194 (McKinney 2013).
128
See Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 78.
129
See 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a)(1) (2010); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 145-b (McKinney 2007).
See also 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2011).
123
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discretion of the government130 and aggrieved parties cannot initiate
the criminal claims. The government may initiate criminal claims in
one of three ways: (1) an indictment voted by a grand jury; (2) the
filing of “an information” by a prosecuting district or state’s attorney
alleging that the crime was committed; or (3) the filing of a criminal
complaint, which petitions the district attorney to initiate the
charges.131
District Attorneys can prosecute health care fraud under
various sections of Title 18 of the United States Code.132 Health care
fraud is defined under Title 18 as an act “to defraud any health care
benefit program; or (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, any of the money or property
owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care benefit
program[.]”133 Depending on the injury sustained as a result of the
fraud, the law provides up to life imprisonment and significant fines
of $250,000 for an individual or $500,000 for organizations.134 One
of the difficulties in pursuing this remedy is that the government must
prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.135 The
statute also requires the government to initiate the action, although
the statute allows the aggrieved party to request the government to
initiate it.136
Both the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Department
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) have cited limited funding as
a significant problem in pursuing health insurance fraud.137
Traditionally, limited funding has hampered the investigation and
prosecution of health care fraud, but the issue regarding funding has
130
How
Courts
Work,
A M.
BAR
ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_netw
ork/how_courts_work/bringingcharge.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
131
Id.
132
18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) (2010).
133
Id.
134
Id.; Appeals of Healthcare and Medicare Fraud Convictions, THE L. OFFICE OF C.F.
COWAN, PLLC, https://www.federalcriminalappeal.lawyer/federal-appeals-of-health-carefraud-and-medicare-fraud-convicti.html (last visited Jul. 8, 2016).
135
18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2010); United States v. Javan, 383 Fed. Appx. 596, 599 (9th Cir.
2010) (“The Government presented evidence sufficient for a rational juror to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Javan ‘knowingly and willfully’ intended to defraud health insurers . . .
.”).
136
18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2010).
137
Janet Shikles, Health Insurance More Resources Needed to Combat Fraud and Abuse,
STATES
GENERAL
ACCOUNTING
OFFICE
(July
28,
1992),
UNITED
http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/104703.pdf.
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changed in recent times.138 The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) has
increased funding for anti-fraud investigations.139 In 2007, the
federal government created Medicare Fraud Strike Forces,140 a joint
program between the DOJ and HHS, in which DOJ prosecutors
collaborate with agents from HHS’s Office of Inspector General to
investigate allegations of fraud to allow Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to suspend payments to providers
suspected of committing fraud.141 However, only 10 out of the 94
judicial districts are designated as Strike Force Districts, and these
are too few.142 These judicial districts each see an average of only 42
people a year charged with health care fraud.143 Comparatively, in
2014, CMS had found that over 17,000 providers committed fraud.144
B.

Civil Penalties

Civil penalties are also available against “authorized users”
committing health care fraud. Civil penalties exist under the Federal
False Claims Act,145 the New York False Claims Act State Finance
Law,146 and New York Consolidated Laws Social Services Law.147
The aggrieved party may initiate civil penalties under the
aforementioned statutes.148 However, such penalties may be too
expensive or burdensome to realize because the damages from the
138

U.S. Attorney Ramping Up Health Care Enforcement in Western Penn., COALITION
AGAINST INSURANCE FRAUD (Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.insurancefraud.org/IFNSdetail.htm?key=21046.
139
Id.; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
140
Informational Brochure, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services: Office of the
Inspector General, Medicare Fraud Strike Force, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/strike-force/ (last
updated June 30, 2016).
141
Id.
142
Id.; Informational Brochure, United States Courts, Court Role and Structure,
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure (last visited Aug. 5,
2016).
143
U.S. Attorney Ramping Up Health Care Enforcement in Western Penn., COALITION
AGAINST INSURANCE FRAUD, http://www.insurancefraud.org/IFNS-detail.htm?key=21046
(last visited Nov. 26, 2015).
144
The
$272
billion
swindle,
THE
ECONOMIST
(May
31,
2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21603078-why-thieves-love-americas-healthcare-system-272-billion-swindle. “Since tighter screening was introduced under Obamacare,
the CMS has stripped 17,000 providers of their licence to bill Medicare.” Id.
145
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2009).
146
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 187-194 (McKinney 2013).
147
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 145-b (McKinney 2007).
148
Id.
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individual incidents of fraud would be very small, and litigation costs
are relatively high.149 Additionally, a victim of fraud can seek
damages as well as restitution by filing a fraud claim in state court.150
The Federal False Claims Act151 is a federal statute that
imposes liability on those who defraud government programs.152
Specifically, the act provides for a civil penalty between $5,000 and
$10,000 “plus 3 times the amount in damages which the Government
sustains because of the act of that person.”153 The False Claims Act
has a whistle blower provision, referred to as qui tam relator,154
which allows people not affiliated with the government to file an
action on behalf of the government.155 The provision rewards the
whistleblower, or relator, with a percentage of the money that the
government recovers because of the qui tam lawsuit.156 Persons
filing under the act can receive between 10% and 30% of any
recovered damages.157 The statute also provides for the recovery of
costs of litigation by the U.S. Government.158 This statute has a 6year statute of limitations.159
New York law imposes civil penalties against those
committing fraud as well. The New York False Claims Act holds
liable individuals that file false claims for payment from any state or
local government.160 First, under the New York False Claims Act,
the New York Attorney General, an individual, or a local government
may file a lawsuit against a person that obtains funds from the state
or local government through fraudulent conduct.161 Fraudulent
conduct includes knowingly making false statements or false records
149
By The Numbers: Fraud Statistics, COALITION AGAINST INSURANCE FRAUD,
http://www.insurancefraud.org/statistics.htm#.Vlpkc4S0HOw (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
“Health care organizations recorded an average cost of $398 per breached record . . . .” Id.
150
Informational Brochure, U.S. Attorney’s Office N.D. of Ga, Understanding
Restitution,
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/victim-witness-assistance/understandingrestitution (last updated Apr. 17, 2015).
151
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2011).
152
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2011).
153
Id.
154
31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2011).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
31 U.S.C. § 3731 (2011).
160
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189 (McKinney 2013).
161
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190 (McKinney 2013).
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to obtain payments for a claim from the government.162 The New
York False Claims Act makes liable anyone who:
(a) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(b) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim;163
Like the federal statute, the New York False Claims Act includes a
qui tam provision, which allows a whistle blower to receive between
15% and 30% of the amount recovered.164 The penalty under this
statute is between $6,000 and $12,000 per claim, and the perpetrator
may be responsible for the government’s legal fees.165 The statute of
limitations is 10 years, which is longer than the federal statute’s 6year statute of limitations.166 Additionally, New York Consolidated
Laws Social Services Law section 145-b creates civil penalties for
false claims.167 This statute defines a false statement as “a claim for
payment made to the state . . . or an entity performing services under
contract to the state . . . which serves as the basis for a claim or a rate
of payment . . . [for] health care services.”168 Section 145-b allows
for the recovery of treble damages as well as monetary penalties that
can be as high as $30,000 per claim for repeat violations.169
A defrauded health insurer may also commence a lawsuit in
state court seeking damages for fraud from the individual service
providers who committed the fraud. Damages for fraud include
nominal damages, which are awarded when the party has not suffered
substantial loss and are often a small monetary sum,170 and punitive
damages, which are intended to punish the defendant.171 In either
case, pursuing many individual service providers is likely to incur

162

N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189 (McKinney 2013).
Id.
164
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190 (McKinney 2013).
165
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189 (McKinney 2013).
166
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 192 (McKinney 2010).
167
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 145-b (McKinney 2007).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 48 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1984)
(stating “[t]he three basic types of legal damages are compensatory, nominal, and punitive”).
171
Id.
163
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considerable litigation expenses.172 It is costly for health insurance
companies to litigate lawsuits against numerous service providers
who cause relatively small amounts of economic injury, as compared
with the much lower cost of litigating a lawsuit against one large
defendant, such as National Union.173
Health insurers that suffer losses from computer systems
fraud only have these remedies available to them, and most of these
remedies are either too difficult or not cost-effective to pursue. The
criminal penalties require government cooperation, and civil penalties
require expensive litigation against numerous service providers. For
these reasons, health insurers are left with no good options.174
V.

PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

This section will discuss how electronic records facilitate the
commission of health care computer systems fraud, as well as make
some preliminary recommendations for health insurers to avoid
losses due to fraud, such as providing insurance coverage to health
insurers for fraud committed specifically by authorized users.
Because of the difficulties that a health insurer faces in pursuing
litigation against the individual committing the fraud, and the ease
with which fraud may be accomplished, the need for health insurance
companies like Universal to properly insure themselves becomes
paramount. The following three features of electronic health care
records (“EHRs”) increase the ease with which health care fraud is
accomplished: (1) the mandated use and proliferation of EHRs; (2)
the electronic nature of EHRs; and (3) the complexity of electronic
datasets, termed “big data.” The mandated use and proliferation of
EHRs make it easier to commit fraud than with paper health care
records. The electronic nature of EHRs creates an inherent
susceptibility to manipulation that could make fraud more difficult to
detect using current technology because of the size and complexity of
the datasets.175 This section will discuss how health care providers
172

Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation,
CENTER
FOR
STATE
COURTS
(Jan.
2013),
NATIONAL
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csph_online2.ashx.
173
Universal, 37 N.E.3d 78.
174
Other than negotiating better contract provisions. See infra section VI.
175
Manipulation of 12,000 Medical Records Made Easy by EHR, HEALTH CARE RENEWAL
BLOG (July 7, 2012), http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/07/manipulation-of-12000medical-records.html. “This is another area where electronic records make possible tasks
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should ensure that their computer fraud indemnification riders protect
them against losses incurred by “authorized users” utilizing their
access to the system to commit insurance fraud.
The recent proliferation of electronic health care records
(“EHRs”)176 is partially driven by mandates in the ACA,177 which is
designed to promote the “meaningful use” of electronic health care
records, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA), which is designed to increase federal funding for health
care technology.178 “Meaningful use” is a program for Medicare that
seeks to increase EHR usage by having health care providers show
that they are using certified EHR technology.179 The ACA mandates
an increase in the number of hospitals and doctors that utilize
EHRs.180 Moreover, “meaningful use” sets objectives that health care
providers must achieve in order to qualify for CMS financial
incentive programs created by the ARRA.181
There are three stages of “meaningful use” objectives of the
ACA, the first of which started in 2011, and the last of which is
scheduled to end in 2018.182 In Stage 1, the objective is data capture
and sharing.183 This means eligible providers received funding to
improve their electronic data capture and sharing of medical
records.184
This includes electronically capturing health care
information, utilizing the captured health care information to track
that are probably impossible with paper. Altering 11,000+ records would be hard in paper
charts, as the alterations would likely stick out in a pronounced manner.” Id.
176
Informational Brochure, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Electronic Health
Records
(EHR)
Incentive
Programs,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/index.html?redirect=/EHRIncentivePrograms/
01_Overview.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2016) [hereinafter “Electronic Health Records”].
177
42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
178
Electronic Health Records, supra note 179.
179
What is Meaningful Use, HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.hrsa.gov/healthit/meaningfuluse/MU%20Stage1%20CQM/mu.html#
(last
visited Apr. 27, 2016) (“Simply put, ‘meaningful use’ means providers need to show they’re
using certified EHR technology in ways that can be measured significantly in quality and in
quantity.”).
180
42 U.S.C. § 3007 (2010).
181
Informational Brochure, HealthIT, Meaningful Use Definition & Objectives,
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/meaningful-use-definition-objectives (last
updated Feb. 6, 2015) [hereinafter “HealthIT”].
182
Id.; Electronic Health Records, supra note 179.
183
HealthIT, supra note 184.
184
Informational Brochure, Aetna Health, Meaningful Use Knowledge Hub,
http://www.athenahealth.com/knowledge-hub/meaningful-use/stages (last visited Feb. 10,
2017).
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clinical conditions, and reporting of clinical quality measures and
public health information.185 The objective in Stage 2 is to utilize the
EHRs for advanced clinical processes.186 Health care providers will
receive additional funding for extending their “EHR capabilities to a
larger portion of their patient populations.”187 The objective in Stage
3 is to utilize EHRs to improve patient outcomes.188 To meet the
objective of Stage 3, health care providers will have to use EHRs to
improve the results of the medical care a patient receives.189 To
qualify for the CMS Medicaid EHR Incentive Program, the health
care provider must “adopt, implement, upgrade or meaningfully use
certified EHR technology . . . .”190 The effect of these “meaningful
use” objectives is that federal funding to health care providers to
meet these objectives increases the use of EHRs. As will be
discussed further below, this increase in EHRs means an increase in
the ability of health care providers to commit fraud.
Since the passage of both the ACA and the ARRA, EHR
utilization has seen predicted increases, which have translated into
considerable “meaningful use” fraud.191 “Meaningful use” fraud
occurs when health care providers receive federal funds under this
program even though they are not actually complying with the
“meaningful use” requirements but rather gaming the system.192
CMS’s financial incentives have provided an additional means for
health care providers to commit fraud by utilizing EHRs. The CMS
185

Informational Brochure, HealthIT, How to Attain Meaningful Use,
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/how-attain-meaningful-use (last visited
Mar. 5, 2017).
186
HealthIT, supra note 184.
187
HealthIT, supra note 184.
188
HealthIT, supra note 184.
189
HealthIT, supra note 184.
190
Informational Brochure, CMS, Medicaid Electronic Health Record Incentive Payments
for Eligible Professionals, CMS (May 2013), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/MLN_MedicaidEHRProgram_Ti
pSheet_EP.pdf.
191
Mark Hagland, Hospital Fined $4.4 Million for Meaningful Use Fraud, HEALTH CARE
INFORMATICS, (May 4, 2015), http://www.health care-informatics.com/news-item/hospitalcfo-fined-44-million-meaningful-use-fraud (“A former hospital CFO has been fined $4.4
million for defrauding the federal government through the directing of staff to falsely attest
to meaningful use under the HITECH (Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health) Act.”).
192
Kyle Murphy, Meaningful use fraud: HHS, DOJ Issue Warning, EHR INTELLIGENCE
(Sept. 25, 2012), https://ehrintelligence.com/news/meaningful-use-fraud-hhs-doj-issuewarning/.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 [2017], Art. 11

564

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

Medicaid EHR Incentive Program is a “pay-and-chase” system.193 A
“pay-and-chase” system means that CMS pays a claim to health care
providers, knowing that a third party is likely responsible for the
claim and then attempts to recover the payment.194 Health care
providers can then submit fraudulent claims, and CMS may not seek
recovery of the money.195
The EHRs’ electronic nature makes fraudulent entry relatively
easy for service providers196 because it allows authorized users to
commit fraud without having to resort to traditional hacking, which
involves the modification of computer code that is outside of the
original programmer’s objective.197 Moreover, EHR fraud is easier to
disguise because the volume and the velocity of the data that an EHR
may submit facilitate the capacity to commit fraud in a nontraditional manner.198
Additionally, EHRs allow for easy “copy and paste” or
“cloning” fraud,199 which occurs when the health care provider
duplicates clinical notes by electronically copying them from one
account and pasting them into another.200 While this technique
allows for quicker data entry, cloning makes it easy for health care
providers to bill for work not performed by simply borrowing clinical
notes from another patient’s record.201 Also, a survey of all 864
hospitals that received subsidies for EHR systems as of March 2012
found that only 24% of hospitals have any sort of policy regulating
193
Heather Caspi, How Common is Meaningful Use Fraud, HEALTH CARE DIVE (June 24,
2015),
http://www.health
caredive.com/news/how-common-is-meaningful-usefraud/401261.
194
Karen Fletcher, Medicare Now Required to Check for Fraud Before Paying Claims,
CALIFORNIA
HEALTH
ADVOCATES
(Oct.
2004),
http://blog.cahealthadvocates.org/2010/10/medicare-checks-for-fraud-before-paying/.
195
Electronic Health Records, supra note 179.
196
Joe Carlson, Feds Eye Crackdown on Cut-and-Paste EHR Fraud, MODERN HEALTH
CARE
(Dec.
10,
2013),
http://www.modernhealth
care.com/article/20131210/NEWS/312109965.
197
Easy Definition of Hacking, CYBER LAWS, http://cyber.laws.com/hacking (last visited
Aug. 5, 2016).
198
Joe Carlson, supra note 199 (“ ‘Certain EHR documentation features, if . . . used
inappropriately, can result in poor data quality or fraud,’ according a report from HHS’
Office of the Inspector General.”).
199
Joe Carlson, supra note 199.
200
Robert Wayde & Alex Krouse, EHRs: Upcoding, Overpayment and the False Claims
Act – Understanding the Risks, AM. BAR ASS’N HEALTH L. SEC. (Nov. 2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/aba_health_esource/2013-14/november/ehrs.html.
201
Joe Carlson, supra note 199.
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proper use of copy and paste.202 The ability of health care providers
to commit fraud increases with the lack of hospital policies that
govern cloning, the ease at which the fraud goes undetected, and the
ease of accomplishing cloning.203
Another possible source of fraud in EHRs occurs when
service providers “upcode” or “upcharge.”204
Upcoding and
upcharging occur when an insurance provider is charged for a more
expensive service than what was provided,205 which can be done by
changing the medical billing code or by simply fraudulently pasting
the data from a more expensive test or procedure into a patient’s
record.206 In 2012, the New York Times found that there was “a
surge in Medicare spending on the most costly services” entered
using EHRs.207 Moreover, a study by the Office of Inspector
General, Department of Health and Human Services, found that
neither CMS nor its contractors had adjusted their policies for
detecting fraud to encompass the new threats brought by EHRs.208 In
this study, the Inspector General found that very few of its
contractors could properly detect “whether a provider had copied
language or overdocumented in a medical record.”209
The proliferation of EHRs in the era of big data makes it
easier for health care providers to commit health care fraud.210 The
term “big data” encompasses data sets that are so complex that
traditional data processing applications are inadequate.211 The
complexity of big data can create many challenges within security,
analysis, or privacy.212 Specifically, security and analysis are
problematic because even though modern computing infrastructure
202

Joe Carlson, supra note 199.
Joe Carlson, supra note 199.
204
Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, Report Finds More Flaws in Digitizing Patient Files,
NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/business/report-findsmore-flaws-in-digitizing-patient-files.html.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Daniel R. Levinson, CMS and its Contractors Have Adopted Few Program Integrity
Practices to Address Vulnerabilities in EHRs, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (Jan. 2014),
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-11-00571.pdf.
209
Id.
210
Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, supra note 207.
211
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allows for real-time anomaly detection, the volume and variety of the
data streams may either lead to false positives or miss anomalies
altogether.213 Privacy is an issue because even though the large
volume of data can be anonymized, those that intend on committing
fraud easily identify the user that created the data or to which patient
the data belongs.214 The volume, velocity, and variety of the data
likewise make processing the data extremely challenging. The
volume of the data makes the process of detecting fraudulent data
from authorized users difficult because of the large amount of
computing power required to process this large amount of
information.215 According to The Economist, “[t]he amount of digital
information increases tenfold every five years.”216 The velocity,217 or
speed at which users enter the data, makes it difficult to detect
fraudulent data even from “authorized users” because the data arrive
too quickly and in such large volumes that the computer system is
unable to utilize traditional methods of analysis to detect fraud.218
The data’s variety also makes it hard to detect fraudulent data from
authorized users, rendering older models for security obsolete.219
Because Universal’s computerized system allowed for direct
submission of claims to the system and the vast majority of claims
are processed, approved, and paid automatically, the above “big data”
paradigm applies.220 One does not need to be a high-tech hacker to
commit health care insurance computer fraud; a mere “authorized
user” can commit “fraudulent entry.”
Thus, to keep up with rapidly advancing technology, health
care providers should ensure that their computer fraud
indemnification riders specifically and unambiguously protect them
against losses incurred by “authorized users” utilizing their access to
the system to commit insurance fraud. To protect against lawsuits
213
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similar to Universal and Morgan Stanley, health insurance providers
seeking to indemnify themselves against losses incurred by
authorized users should expressly include fraudulent claims by
authorized users in the definition of computer fraud.
The insurance industry should offer insurance that provides
coverage against losses due to authorized users submitting fraudulent
claims. An insurance policy providing coverage against losses due to
fraudulent entry by authorized users has a largely untapped market
that could provide revenue for forward-thinking insurance
companies.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The current law governing indemnification for computer
systems fraud does not benefit the insured. In Universal, the New
York Court of Appeals found that a rider indemnifying the insured
for losses from computer systems fraud covers only unauthorized use
of the computer system and did not cover fraudulent use by an
authorized user.221 Hence, the court in Universal precluded coverage
for losses incurred by an authorized user.222
This note’s analysis of the various criteria for both fraudulent
use and unauthorized users demonstrates that courts have discretion
to find that similar provisions for insurance fraud could cover the
insured in future cases. Additionally, the difficulty that health
insurance companies face in seeking redress should cause the insured
to carefully review the wording of their contracts; otherwise, they
have no guarantee that they will be covered for this type of fraud.
As illustrated by both Universal and Morgan Stanley, both the
New York Court of Appeals and the Superior Court of New Jersey
Appellate Division have precluded coverage for losses incurred by an
authorized user of the insured’s computer system committing
Health insurance companies seeking
fraudulent acts.223
indemnification for these kinds of losses should seek additional
advice as to whether their current Computer Systems Fraud rider

221

Universal, 37 N.E.3d at 81. “[W]e conclude that it unambiguously applies to losses
incurred from unauthorized access to Universal’s computer system, and not to losses
resulting from fraudulent content submitted to the computer system by authorized users.” Id.
222
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223
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offers the coverage they seek, and in the case that it does not, they
should seek additional coverage.
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